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Expanded Standing Under the Louisiana Unfair 
Trade Practices Act and Possible Employee Actions 
Under the Act 
INTRODUCTION 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cheramie 
Services v. Shell Deepwater Production1 resolved a split in the 
circuits regarding who has standing to bring a private action under 
Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 
commonly referred to as the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(LUTPA).2 Standing is no longer limited to consumers and 
business competitors but is available to any person who can show 
any ascertainable loss of money or movable property as the result 
of another’s use of unfair trade practices.3 Because “unfair trade 
practices” are not statutorily defined and must be determined by 
the courts on a case-by-case basis,4 this expansion in standing 
creates an opportunity for any number of new kinds of plaintiffs to 
assert claims under the statute. As such, Louisiana courts have now 
been tasked with discerning unfair trade practices in unfamiliar and 
formerly foreclosed contexts, and practitioners have been left to 
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 1. 35 So. 3d 1053 (La. 2010). It should be mentioned here that the strength 
of the Cheramie ruling as a means of influencing lower courts is somewhat 
unclear. Chief Justice Kimball did not participate in the deliberation of the 
opinion and three justices concurred in the result, indicating that only three 
justices subscribed to the opinion announcing the judgment of the court. 
However, both of the justices who assigned reasons in their concurrences 
referred to the opinion as being that of a “majority.” Id. at 1064–65 (Johnson, J., 
concurring); Id. at 1065 (Guidry, J., concurring). Justice Weimer, in the opinion 
referred to as that of the majority, uses the phrase “we hold” in announcing the 
rejection of the business competitor/consumer limitation on standing under the 
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Id. at 1054. He further states that 
“contrary holdings are hereby repudiated.” Id. at 1058. At least one Louisiana 
appellate court opinion and three U.S. District Court opinions have recognized 
Cheramie as abrogating the business competitor/consumer limitation on 
standing. See Corley v. Se. Metals Mfg. Co., Inc., 2011 WL 3665015, at *4 
(W.D. La. Aug. 19, 2011); Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund v. Biomeasure, 
Inc., 2011 WL 3268108, at *6 (E.D. La. July 28, 2011); Home Builders Ass’n v. 
Martin, 2010 WL 5109987, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 8, 2010); Bogues v. La. 
Energy Consultants, Inc., 2011 WL 3477033, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 3d Aug. 10, 
2011). One U.S. District Court has noted in passing that the Louisiana Supreme 
Court was “evenly divided” on the issue in Cheramie, and that the argument that 
LUTPA actions are limited to business competitors and consumers “may no 
longer be sound.” Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 2011 WL 2847436, at *5 n.5 (E.D. La. 
July 14, 2011). 
 2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401–26 (2003 and Supp. 2011). 
 3. Cheramie, 35 So. 3d at 1058. 
 4. See infra Part I.B.1. 




wonder whether, and to what extent, this ruling has “open[ed] the 
‘litigation floodgates.’”5 
This Comment examines the Cheramie decision with the 
purpose of identifying what practical effect the Court’s ruling will 
have on the future use of Louisiana’s unfair trade practices law by 
private litigants. After analyzing the language of the decision, the 
Comment exposes some of the decision’s more important 
implications for LUTPA by suggesting some potential avenues by 
which employees may exploit the recent expansion in standing 
under the statute. While employees are not the only class of 
potential plaintiffs to whom private actions under the statute may 
now be available, past attempts by employees to use LUTPA6 
suggest that they will certainly be among the first to test the 
statute’s applicability now that the jurisprudential rule denying 
them standing has been abrogated.  
Three possible employee actions under LUTPA are of 
immediate concern. First, in certain circumstances, Louisiana 
employees may now have a new statutory alternative to the tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.7 Second, 
employees might use LUTPA as a vehicle to bring actions for 
violations of other statutes that do not themselves provide a private 
right of action.8 Finally, a current or former employee who has not 
yet become a competitor of his employer may now be able to bring 
a LUTPA action in response to the employer’s threatened 
enforcement of an overbroad noncompetition agreement.9 
I. BACKGROUND 
Before delving into a discussion of the Cheramie decision’s 
implications for future private actions under the Louisiana Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, some background information will be 
instructive. This section first provides a brief look at the history 
                                                                                                             
 5. James R. Chastain & Linda Perez Clark, Louisiana Supreme Court 
Interprets Unfair Trade Practices Act, LOUISIANA LAW BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.louisianalawblog.com/commercial-litigation-louisiana-supreme-
court-interprets-unfair-trade-practices-act.html. 
 6. See Davis v. Manpower Int’l, Inc., 623 So. 2d 946, 947 (La. Ct. App. 
4th 1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1173 (La. 1993) (denying LUTPA standing to 
an employee terminated by new employer after she helped the new employer 
obtain her former employer’s client list); Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 So. 2d 
706, 707 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1982), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982) 
(denying LUTPA standing to an employee alleging that his termination had been 
“in furtherance” of his employer’s unfair trade practices). 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. See infra Part III.C. 
 9. See infra Part III.D. 




and development of state unfair trade practices laws. This survey is 
important for understanding the context in which the Louisiana 
statute was enacted and provides the bulk of the few extant clues as 
to the legislature’s intent for the statute. This background 
discussion also covers some of the more important aspects of the 
Louisiana statute, including what conduct the statute prohibits, the 
special role of the courts in interpreting the statute’s broad 
prohibition, and the parameters of the private action under the 
statute. This section then addresses the development of the circuit 
split on the issue of standing to bring a private action under the 
statute. 
A. State Unfair Trade Practices Acts 
By the middle of the 20th century, the increasingly impersonal 
modern marketplace had thrown the conventional legal remedies 
for consumer controversies into a state of cost-prohibitive 
obsolescence.10 That is, advances in production and transportation 
created a marketplace where businesses, increasing in size and 
distance from the consumer, were less susceptible to the traditional 
discipline of “good will.” Thus, consumers were more vulnerable 
to minor yet frequent harms whose remedies would not be worth 
the expense of litigation.11 Sensing the growing need for a new 
approach to consumer protection, the legislatures of the various 
states, starting in the late 1950s, began to enact statutes designed to 
prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices.12 These acts, which 
came to be termed “Little FTC Acts,” were largely based on 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, which 
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,”13 though other model unfair trade 
practices acts also provided some guidance.14 The Federal Trade 
Commission is said to have encouraged the enactment of these 
laws on account of the Commission’s scarce budget resources and 
                                                                                                             
 10. See William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 
TUL. L. REV. 724, 725 (1972) (“In most consumer controversies the risks and 
expenses of investigation, counsel, and litigation far outweigh the likely 
recoveries that could reasonably have been anticipated with traditional actions 
for warranty, misrepresentation, or fraud.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices 
Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446 
(1991). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 14. See Sovern, supra note 12, at 446–52; see also Council on State 
Governments, Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 
1970 Suggested State Legislation 141. 




inability to monitor local conditions effectively.15 By 1981, every 
state had enacted an unfair trade practices statute.16  
In an effort to adequately ensnare the wide variety of possible 
unfair and deceptive trade practices, the federal statute, upon 
which the state laws were based, was drafted in intentionally broad 
language, leaving the determination of what actually constituted a 
violation of the statute up to the Commission and the courts.17 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has noted that both the House and the Senate 
deliberately refused to give any particular definition to “unfair 
methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” 
when adopting this section of the FTC Act.18 Congress understood 
that the realities of modern trade demanded an appropriately 
malleable prohibition because “[t]here is no limit to human 
inventiveness in this field.”19 Crafted in the pattern of their broadly 
worded federal forerunner, most state unfair and deceptive trade 
practices acts are laws of similarly expansive applicability.20 
Like the FTC Act, state unfair trade practices statutes usually 
provide a framework for enforcement by a public authority, most 
often the state’s attorney general.21 One significant difference, 
though, between state unfair trade practices acts and the FTC Act 
is that in every state except Iowa, the state acts permit private 
actions.22 The inclusion of private rights of action in state unfair 
trade practices laws was intended to ensure that enforcement of the 
statute’s prohibitions would not be circumscribed by the often 
limited resources of state attorneys general and other enforcement 
agencies.23 Some state statutes only permit injunctive or other 
equitable relief to private litigants, while others permit actions for 
damages.24 Many allow for class action suits, and a few permit 
                                                                                                             
 15. Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or 
Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 125, 126 (1987). 
 16. Sovern, supra note 12, at 446. 
 17. See H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 18. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972). 
 19. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)). The 
House Conference Report continued: “Even if all known unfair practices were 
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over 
again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an 
endless task.” H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 20. Sovern, supra note 12, at 446–52. 
 21. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1404 (Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
42-110d (Westlaw 2011). 
 22. STATE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAW (CCH) ¶1700 (2007). 
 23. See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 776 (Mass. 1975), 
where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that a primary 
motivation behind the adoption of the private right of action in that state was the 
state’s attorney general’s inability to handle the volume of complaints received. 
 24. STATE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAW (CCH) ¶1700 (2007). 




third parties to bring suit.25 The opportunity to recover attorney’s 
fees is another common characteristic of private actions under state 
unfair trade practices acts.26 The availability of damages, 
attorney’s fees, and class actions under the state acts are intended 
to ensure the economic viability of private enforcement.27 
B. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA) 
Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Law28 was enacted in 1972 and is in many ways a typical state 
unfair trade practices statute.29 Among other things, the 1972 
legislation created a new consumer agency and Consumer 
Advisory Board and enacted a deceptive trade practices statute to 
be enforced by the state’s attorney general, the consumer agency, 
and the parish district attorneys.30 The legislation also created a 
new private right of action under the statute.31  
1. Prohibited Conduct 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:1405(A) curtly states 
that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby 
declared unlawful.”32 Thus, LUTPA’s prohibition against unfair 
acts or practices is as broadly worded as the FTC Act.33 In fact, the 
language chosen by the legislature for the definition of unlawful 
conduct comprised the most general of the alternative definitions 
offered by the Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id.  
 26. Lovett, supra note 10, at 744. 
 27. Id. See Lovett, supra note 10, at 743–46, for a theoretical framework 
within which to weigh the policy values of the various approaches to 
encouraging private enforcement by reducing the risks to potential claimants and 
increasing the costs to purported violators (i.e., allowing for the recovery of 
attorney’s fees, the possibility of punitive damages, and the use of representative 
or class actions). See Sovern, supra note 12, at 449–52, for a criticism of the use 
of FTC standards by state courts to define deceptive practices in private actions 
under the state acts, arguing that this practice tips the cost–risk balance too far in 
favor of potential claimants. 
 28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401–26 (2003 and Supp. 2011). 
 29. Patrick D. Breeden & William A. Lovett, Louisiana’s New Unfair Trade 
Practice and Consumer Protection Law, 20 LA. B. J. 307 (1973). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 33. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (“Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). 




Protection Act.34 The model legislation’s explanatory comments 
indicate that the chosen language “enables the enforcement official 
to reach not only deceptive practices that prey upon consumers, but 
also unfair methods that injure competition.”35 
Given the broad language of this prohibition, it has been left to 
the courts to decide, on a case-by-case basis, what conduct 
constitutes a violation of the statute.36 The standard formulated by 
the courts for discerning LUTPA violations is almost as ambiguous 
as the statute itself, targeting conduct that “offends established 
public policy and . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious.”37 Courts have also held 
that in order to recover under LUTPA, a plaintiff must prove 
“some element of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other 
unethical conduct” on the part of the defendant.38 
The reach of these standards has been limited somewhat by the 
jurisprudential qualifications that the statute does not (1) prevent a 
business from pursuing a profit, even at the expense of its 
competitors, so long as the means used are not “egregious,” or (2) 
provide an alternate remedy for simple breaches of contract.39 
Beyond this, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:1406 exempts 
from LUTPA’s purview “[a]ny conduct which complies with 
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”40 
Examples of conduct found by Louisiana courts to constitute 
unfair and deceptive trade practices include an attempt by an auto 
repair garage to charge a customer twice for the same work,41 a 
creditor’s “repeatedly suing for a balance that the creditor knows is 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Breeden & Lovett, supra note 29, at 312.  
 35. Council on State Governments, Model Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act, 1970 Suggested State Legislation 142. 
 36. Cheramie Services, Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Production, Inc., 35 So. 3d 
1053, 1059 (La. 2010); Strahan v. State Dep’t of Agriculture and Forestry, 645 
So. 2d 1162, 1165 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1994). 
 37. Cheramie, 35 So. 3d at 1059 (quoting Moore v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d 630, 633 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1978)). The first use by a 
Louisiana court of this oft-quoted standard can in fact be traced to the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Moore. However, it should be noted that the court there, in 
an effort to give the words of the Louisiana statute their “common meaning,” 
simply adopted the standard articulated by prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the correlative portion of the FTC Act. 364 So. 2d at 634. 
 38. Cheramie, 35 So. 3d at 1059 (quoting Dufau v. Creole Engineering, 
Inc., 465 So. 2d 752, 758 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1985)) (emphasis added). 
 39. Cheramie, 35 So. 3d at 1060 (quoting Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 
F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1406(4) (Supp. 2011). 
 41. Joseph v. Hendrix, 536 So. 2d 448, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1988). 




more than the amount due,”42 the wrongful repossession of a 
collateral,43 and both the collection and dissemination of 
confidential information from the trash of a competing firm.44 The 
violation of a statute closely related in purpose to LUTPA may 
also be found to be an unfair trade practice.45 
2. The Private Right of Action 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:1409(A) provides that: 
Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or 
property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive 
method, act, or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, 
may bring an action individually, but not in a representative 
capacity to recover actual damages.46 
LUTPA defines the word “person” as “a natural person, 
corporation, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated 
association, and any other legal entity.”47 Louisiana courts have yet 
to define “ascertainable loss” as used in the statute, though the 
courts of other states consider it to mean that the loss is “capable of 
being discovered, observed, or established.”48 Damages have been 
awarded under the statute for a variety of things, including lost 
wages and mental anguish and humiliation.49 
If a party bringing a private action under LUTPA is ultimately 
awarded damages, the statute also entitles the party to reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs.50 Furthermore, if the court finds that the 
unfair or deceptive practice was knowingly used—that is, after the 
defendant had been put on notice by the attorney general—then 
treble damages must be awarded.51 However, as a counterbalance 
to the opportunities for treble damages and attorney’s fees, a court 
                                                                                                             
 42. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Walker, 488 So. 2d 209, 213 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
1986). 
 43. Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d 630, 631 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 1978). 
 44. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Steimle & Associates, Inc., 652 So. 2d 
44, 46 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1995). 
 45. See infra Part III.C. 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1402(8) (Supp. 2011). 
 48. Lentini v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of New York, 479 F. Supp. 2d 
292, 302 (D. Conn. 2007); Scott v. Western Int’l Surplus Sales Inc., 517 P.2d 
661, 663 (Or. 1973). 
 49. See Slayton v. Davis, 901 So. 2d 1246, 1255–56 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2005). 
 50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 51. Id. 




that finds that an action was brought in bad faith or for purposes of 
harassment may award attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant.52 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:1409(E) requires a 
plaintiff to bring his private action under LUTPA within a period 
of one year from the time of the transaction or act that gives rise to 
the suit.53 The courts have interpreted this one-year period as being 
peremptive, rather than simply prescriptive.54 
3. The Issue of Standing 
Before the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Cheramie, 
there had been a longstanding split in the circuits on the issue of 
who had standing to bring a private action under LUTPA.55 
Reading section 51:1409(A)’s grant of standing to “any person” in 
conjunction with section 51:1402(8)’s all-encompassing definition 
of “person,” it would appear that standing to assert a claim under 
LUTPA is available to anyone who has suffered a loss of money or 
property due to another person’s use of unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.56 Before Cheramie, however, only Louisiana’s First 
Circuit Court of Appeal had consistently given such a broad 
interpretation to LUTPA’s grant of standing.57 Most other courts 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(E) (Supp. 2011). 
 54. Mayo v. Simon, 646 So. 2d 973, 976 (La. Ct. App. 3rd 1994); Spencer-
Ellington, Inc. v. Service Merchandise, Inc., 562 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 1990); Canal Marine Supply, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp. of 
Waukegan, Ill., 522 So. 2d 1201, 1203–4 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1988). In contrast 
with prescriptive periods, peremptive periods may be neither interrupted nor 
suspended. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3461 cmt. c (2011). The Canal Marine court 
explained that the statute’s primary concern with the public interest and also its 
penal nature militate towards a strict construction of the specified time period. 
522 So. 2d at 1203. Furthermore, the court noted that “[i]f the legislature had 
wanted this time period to be interruptible it could either have said so 
specifically or have let the ordinary rules of prescription apply by not making 
special provision for it in the act. It did neither.” Id. at 1204. See generally Justin 
M. Woodard, Comment, “Unnecessary to Address”?: Tackling the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s Open Question of Whether a Continuing Tort Can Suspend the 
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act’s One-Year Peremptive Period, 85 TUL. 
L. REV. 865 (2011). 
 55. See Alexander M. McIntyre, Jr., Gerardo R. Barrios, Brian M. Ballay, 
Standing Under the LUTPA—The Circuit Split Widens, 54 LA. B.J. 362 (2007). 
 56. Id. at 363. 
 57. See Capital House Preservation Co. v. Perryman Consultants, Inc., 725 
So. 2d 523, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1998); Bell Pass Terminal, Inc. v. Jolin, Inc., 
618 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1993), writ denied, 626 So. 2d 1172 
(La. 1993) (“Although business consumers and competitors are included in the 
group afforded this private right of action, they are not its exclusive members.”); 
Roustabouts, Inc. v. Hamer, 447 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1984). But 




limited standing under LUTPA to “consumers” and “business 
competitors,” including Louisiana’s Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts 
of appeal, the federal district courts in Louisiana, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.58 At least one court 
suggested that the restriction could be inferred from section 
51:1405(A)’s explicit concern with “methods of competition” and 
acts and practices “in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”59 
Louisiana’s Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal were 
inconsistent on the issue, giving sometimes broad and sometimes 
narrow interpretations of LUTPA’s grant of standing.60 
The opinion rendered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana in Hamilton v. Business Partners, Inc. 
provides an excellent analysis of the origins and extension of the 
business competitor/consumer limitation on standing under 
LUTPA.61 The court there correctly traced the limitation back to 
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s 1982 opinion in Gil v. Metal Service 
Corporation.62 In Gil, an employee brought an action under 
LUTPA against his former employer, alleging that his termination 
had been “‘in furtherance’ of deceptive trade practices.”63 The 
court denied him standing, stating that the statute “has been 
construed to give protection only to consumers and business 
competitors.”64 As authority for this assertion, though, the court 
                                                                                                             
 
see Thibaut v. Thibaut, 607 So. 2d 587, 607 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1992), writs 
denied, 612 So. 2d 37, 38, 101 (La. 1993) (holding that individual partners 
lacked standing under LUTPA because they were neither consumers nor 
business competitors). 
 58. Gardes Directional Drilling v. Turnkey Exploration, Co., 98 F.3d 860, 
867–68 (5th Cir. 1996); National Gypsum Co. v. Ace Wholesale, Inc., 738 So. 
2d 128, 129–130 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1999); Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 So. 2d 
706, 707 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1982), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982). 
 59. Phillips v. Berner, 789 So. 2d 41, 49 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2001), writ 
denied, 798 So. 2d 119 (La. 2001). 
 60. Compare Monroe Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 622 
So. 2d 760, 763 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1993), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1993) 
(adopting the broad interpretation of standing), with Double-Eight Oil & Gas v. 
Caruthurs Producing Co., Inc., 942 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006) 
(limiting standing to consumers and business competitors); compare Doland v. 
ACM Gaming Co., 921 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2005) (LUTPA “gives 
a right of action to anyone who suffers any ascertainable loss of money. . . .”), 
with Vermillion Hospital, Inc. v. Patout, 906 So. 2d 688, 693 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2005) (“LUTPA does not grant a right of action to every person or business 
entity that is a victim of unethical or unfair business practices.”). 
 61. 938 F. Supp. 370, 372 (E.D. La. 1996). 
 62. 412 So. 2d 706. 
 63. Id. at 707. 
 64. Id. 




only cited two of its own prior decisions, which, in fact, did not 
address the scope of LUTPA’s grant of standing.65 Significantly, 
the Gil court did not put forth any rationale for the limitation of 
standing, simply relying on how the statute had been “construed” 
in the past.66 In 1983, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit cited Gil as 
authority for its limitation of standing to consumers and business 
competitors in Morris v. Rental Tools, Inc.67 Again, no rationale 
was given.68 Then, in 1992, the U.S. Fifth Circuit, citing to Morris, 
adopted the business competitor/consumer limitation on standing.69 
Louisiana’s federal district courts were thereby bound to apply the 
limitation, as was done, albeit reluctantly, by the court in 
Hamilton.70 
Commentary on private actions for deceptive trade practices 
contemporaneous with LUTPA’s enactment did suggest that the 
primary concern of both federal and state unfair trade practices 
laws was redress for consumers and business competitors injured 
by unfair and deceptive practices.71 Early commentary on LUTPA 
also suggested that the statute was designed to protect consumers 
and competing businesses.72 That the legislature intended business 
competitors and consumers to be the exclusive beneficiaries of 
LUTPA’s protections, however, is not made evident by this 
commentary. A strict reading of the explanatory comments to the 
model legislation on which LUTPA is based might indicate that 
standing to bring a private action should be limited to consumers 
only, as no mention of business competitors is made in the 
comment explaining private actions.73 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. The Gil court cited Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th 1979), and National Oil Service of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brown, 381 
So. 2d 1269 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1980), in which, as the Hamilton court noted, the 
issue of standing did not arise because both cases concerned plaintiffs who were 
competitors and therefore clearly within the reach of the statute. Hamilton, 938 
F. Supp. at 372. 
 66. 412 So. 2d at 707. 
 67. 435 So. 2d 528, 532. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192, 1205. 
 70. 938 F. Supp. at 372. 
 71. See William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 
23 ADMIN. L. REV. 271 (1970); Lovett, supra note 10, at 730. 
 72. See James E. Boren, Comment, The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice 
and Consumer Protection Act: An Analysis, 34 LA. L. REV. 634 (1974); Paul L. 
Zimmering, Comment, Louisiana’s Consumer Protection Law—Three Years of 
Operation, 50 TUL. L. REV. 375 (1975); Breeden & Lovett, supra note 29. 
 73. Council on State Governments, Model Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act, 1970 Suggested State Legislation 144 (“Section 8 
provides for private and class actions, and for payment of attorney’s fees and 
costs, so that the private bar may be brought into the consumer protection field.  




Given the divergent and sometimes ill-founded approaches to 
the issue of standing under LUTPA exhibited in the case law, this 
area of the law called out for guidance from the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. Prior to Cheramie, though, the supreme court had 
maintained the circuit split by denying writs of certiorari both to 
decisions adopting the broad view of LUTPA’s grant of standing 
and decision adopting the limited view.74 
II. THE CHERAMIE DECISION 
In April 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court finally addressed 
the parameters of LUTPA’s grant of standing for private actions. 
The court’s treatment of the issue, however, has left some 
significant uncertainty as to what may or may not constitute a 
competent private action under LUTPA in the future. 
A. Development of the Case 
In Cheramie Services v. Shell Deepwater Production, an oil 
industry service provider (Cheramie) brought suit against an oil 
company (Shell) and a competing service provider (Filco), 
asserting a number of causes of action arising from alleged acts by 
and between the two defendants, including one based on their use 
of unfair trade practices.75 Cheramie was one of a number of 
companies engaged in the business of providing support personnel 
for activities on offshore drilling platforms.76 Its unfair trade 
practices claim against Shell and Filco alleged collusion between 
the two to misappropriate Cheramie’s employees. 
In 1997, Cheramie contracted with Shell “to furnish all tools, 
equipment, materials, labor and supervision in order to provide the 
furnishing of clerical support” on Shell’s “Auger” tension-leg-
platform.77 Cheramie then assigned to the platform two clerks who 
would work alternating 14-day shifts, such that one of them was 
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 74. Compare Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 707 (La. Ct. App. 
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 75. 35 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (La. 2010). 
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always present on the platform.78 Approximately six months later, 
though, Shell stopped paying Cheramie for the services of the two 
clerks and began paying Filco for the services of those same two 
clerks.79 Cheramie alleged that Shell’s actions in this incident 
amounted to a wrongful termination of the contract and a breach of 
contract.80 
Cheramie also alleged that shortly after this episode involving 
the two clerks, it submitted a bid to provide a logistics coordinator 
on another Shell platform and then sent the prospective coordinator 
to New Orleans to be interviewed for the position by Shell 
employees.81 The Cheramie employee attested that she was told 
during the interview that she would have to work for Filco if she 
wanted the job, as it was Filco who had actually submitted the 
winning bid, not Cheramie.82 In need of work, the prospective 
logistics coordinator left Cheramie’s employ to work for Filco.83 
In 2001, Filco settled with Cheramie for dismissal of the suit.84 
In 2007, the trial court granted Shell’s motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety. Cheramie 
appealed the trial court’s findings that there had been no breach of 
contract and that LUTPA did not apply.85 The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the breach of 
contract claim but reversed the dismissal of the LUTPA claim.86 
Though Shell argued that Cheramie did not have standing because 
it was neither a consumer nor a business competitor, the court 
upheld the LUTPA claim based on the solidary liability of 
conspiring tortfeasors provided by Civil Code article 2324.87 
Under the court’s rationale, the business competitor/consumer 
standing requirement was not a bar to Cheramie’s claim against 
Shell because Shell’s conspiracy with Cheramie’s competitor Filco 
brought Shell within LUTPA’s reach.88 This conspiracy theory 
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 79. Id. at 1055. In support of a motion for summary judgment, the two 
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 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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 86. Cheramie Services, Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Production, Inc., 14 So. 3d 
1, 10 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2009). 
 87. Id. at 6–9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324(A) (2011) provides that “[h]e who 
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 88. Cheramie, 14 So. 3d at 9. 




approach to LUTPA standing was not new and, as the Fourth 
Circuit noted, could be traced to a line of prior jurisprudence from 
Louisiana’s First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits.89 
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Rejects the Business 
Competitor/Consumer Limitation on Standing 
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately rejected the 
contention that standing under LUTPA should be limited to 
consumers and business competitors.90 More importantly, though, 
the court held that no person who could assert an ascertainable loss 
of money or movable property as a result of another’s use of unfair 
trade practices should be barred from bringing a suit under 
LUTPA.91 The court reached this conclusion through the simplest 
method of statutory construction—that based on the plain language 
of the statute.92 
The court first cited Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
51:1405(A) to establish the prohibition of “unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct 
of any trade or commerce.”93 It then cited section 51:1409(A)’s 
grant of a private right of action to “any person” who suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property due to another person’s 
violation of 1405(A)’s prohibition.94 Finally, the court quoted 
section 51:1402’s definitions of “consumer,” “consumer 
transaction,” “person,” and “‘trade’ or ‘commerce.’”95 Reading 
these sections together, the court concluded: 
An examination of these sections of LUTPA reveals that 
the legislation contains no language that would clearly and 
expressly bar a “person” (such as the individual and the 
corporation that are the plaintiffs herein) from bringing an 
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action for unfair trade practices. To the contrary, LUTPA 
grants a right of action to any person, natural or juridical, 
who suffers an ascertainable loss as a result of another 
person’s use of unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce. Although business consumers and competitors 
are included in the group afforded this private right of 
action, they are not its exclusive members. . . . An 
evaluation of the words of this statute leads to the 
conclusion that, consistent with the definition of the word 
“person,” there is no such limitation on those who may 
assert a LUTPA cause of action.96 
The statute contained no “clear, unequivocal and affirmative 
expression” that the private right of action should be limited to 
business competitors and consumers, and so there could be no such 
limitation.97 Beyond this, the language of the ruling appears to 
suggest that the relationship between the parties involved will no 
longer have any effect upon standing to bring a private action 
under LUTPA. The court’s parenthetical qualification of “person” 
with the phrase “such as the individual and the corporation that are 
plaintiffs herein” may create some doubt as to the breadth of the 
court’s interpretation of LUTPA’s grant of standing, possibly 
leaving room for the argument that standing under LUTPA should 
still be limited to business competitors, consumers, and plaintiffs 
in situations closely analogous to that of Cheramie.98 But, the 
general thrust of the opinion evidences an intent to free the phrase 
“any person” from being a function of the relationship of the 
parties involved in the dispute. 
C. The Court Emphasizes the “Limitations” on LUTPA Actions 
The court went on to cite certain aspects of the statute and 
earlier cases interpreting the statute in order to emphasize the 
limitations on private actions under LUTPA.99 The court first noted 
that the legislature, in enacting LUTPA, provided “certain limiting 
features.”100 These “limiting features” are (1) the award of 
attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant in the case of a 
groundless, bad-faith claim or a claim brought for the purpose of 
harassment, and (2) the fact that the award of treble damages is 
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limited to cases where the defendant has previously been put on 
notice by the attorney general that the conduct in question 
constitutes an unfair trade practice.101 The reason for the court’s 
mention of these “certain limiting features” is unclear, though it 
might have been meant to assuage, at least rhetorically, fears that 
the newly relaxed standing requirements will result in a flood of 
LUTPA litigation. 
The court then stated that after its presently mandated 
expansion of standing under LUTPA, the true limitation on 
bringing private actions under the statute will be a plaintiff’s 
burden of showing an unfair or deceptive act or practice, a burden 
that the court made clear its opinion had not diminished.102 The 
problem, of course, is that the standard by which Louisiana courts 
discern an unfair or deceptive practice is vague and not intended to 
draw any hard lines.103 
The court attempted to address the amorphous judicial standard 
for identifying LUTPA violations, i.e., the rule that LUTPA 
prohibits conduct that “offends established public policy and . . . is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially 
injurious.”104 In doing so, the court stated, in explicit agreement 
with a concurring justice who did not subscribe to the majority’s 
jettisoning of the business competitor/consumer limitation, that 
“the range of prohibited practices under LUTPA is extremely 
narrow.”105 The court made no effort, however, to define the 
strictures of that narrowness other than echoing the assertion that 
“[b]usinesses . . . are free to pursue profit, even at the expense of 
competitors, so long as the means are not egregious.”106 This lack 
of definition was not helped by the fact that the court’s ultimate 
rejection of the plaintiff’s claim actually seemed to be more rooted 
in the policy of favoring an employee’s interests in his own 
mobility over an employer’s competitive interests, rather than any 
policy or interpretation more broadly applicable to LUTPA claims 
in general.107 
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D. Counterargument in the Concurrence 
Three Justices concurred in the result, with two of them 
assigning reasons.108 In contending that the court should not have 
dispensed with the business competitor/consumer limitation on 
standing, Justice Johnson argued several points.109  
First, she cited “the purpose of LUTPA,” which was 
“essentially a response to [consumers’] dissatisfaction with their 
treatment in the marketplace.”110 She then suggested that the 
references to “competition” and “trade and commerce” in 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:1405(A) “[indicate] an 
intent by the legislature to allow business competitors to pursue an 
action [against] an adversary who has used deceptive trade 
practices.”111 The combination of this legislative intent with the 
purpose behind the statute was sufficient for Justice Johnson to 
conclude that standing should be limited to business competitors 
and consumers.112 
This counterargument is problematic. Although state unfair and 
deceptive trade practices acts were generated with the immediate 
purposes of protecting consumers and deterring anticompetitive 
practices, it does not necessarily follow that standing to bring a 
private action under LUTPA should be limited to consumers and 
business competitors. This limitation on standing both restricts 
enforcement, which the inclusion of private actions was intended 
to enhance, and artificially narrows the range of activities that fall 
within the statute’s prohibition, which was intentionally designed 
to cast a wide net. It is entirely possible that a person who is 
neither a consumer nor a business competitor may be placed in a 
position where he is harmed by the conduct of another that is also 
detrimental to that other person’s consumers or business 
competitors. For example, an employer who regularly defrauds his 
customers may need to fire, demote, or deny a promotion to a 
particular employee who would object to or report the employer’s 
conduct. If the employer did not do this, he would be unable to 
continue to engage in the unfair trade practice, and the employee 
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would therefore be harmed by the unfair trade practice. The Gil 
case, discussed later, provides a prime example.113 
Justice Johnson also gave great weight to the fact that the 
majority of the prior case law on the issue subscribed to the limited 
view of standing.114 As discussed earlier, the line of cases 
restricting standing under LUTPA does not appear to have been 
grounded in any thoroughly explicated rationale.115 However, the 
force of this jurisprudence is enhanced by the fact that, as Justice 
Johnson noted, in the almost 30 years since the rule was first 
pronounced, the legislature has not amended the statute so as to 
suggest that the limited interpretation is erroneous.116 
III. OPENING THE DOOR TO NEW EMPLOYEE ACTIONS? 
After Cheramie, “any person,” broadly defined, who can show 
any ascertainable loss of money or property resulting from 
another’s use of practices prohibited by Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 51:1405 has standing to bring a private action under 
LUTPA. The fact that violations of section 51:1405 are not 
legislatively defined and must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis means Louisiana courts have now been tasked with 
discerning LUTPA violations in any number of new contexts not 
involving consumers or business competitors. Absent legislative 
intervention, just what kind of plaintiffs and circumstances will 
constitute appropriate parties and predicates for private actions 
under the statute will be determined in the common law of LUTPA 
in the coming years.  
This part of the Comment explores the possible extent to which 
LUTPA actions have been made newly available to one particular 
class of likely claimants—employees. Although the following 
discussion focuses on LUTPA issues as they relate specifically to 
employees, many of the same issues will have to be addressed 
when considering any new class of plaintiffs who might seek to 
make use of LUTPA.117 Furthermore, the possible strategies for 
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employee uses of LUTPA should also indicate, by analogy, 
opportunities for other types of plaintiffs. The following 
discussion, then, has value both as a guide for possible LUTPA 
claims by employees and as a framework within which to consider 
the possibility of LUTPA actions by other classes of plaintiffs. 
The potential availability or non-availability of LUTPA actions 
to employees after Cheramie is discussed as a preliminary matter. 
Then, LUTPA is examined as a new statutory alternative to the tort 
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and also as a 
vehicle by which employees can seek redress for violations of 
statutes that do not themselves provide for private rights of action. 
Finally, the use of LUTPA is considered as a possible response to 
an employer’s threatened enforcement of an overbroad 
noncompetition agreement. 
A. Employees and LUTPA—Preliminary Concerns 
Under the prior business competitor/consumer standing rule, 
employees were barred by the courts from bringing LUTPA causes 
of action against their employers.118 At the same time, employers 
could bring LUTPA actions against former employees who went to 
work for competitors or started their own competing business.119  
The courts of some states have found that employer–employee 
relations do not fall within the intended scope of their Little FTC 
Acts.120 These conclusions are usually predicated on a court’s 
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 118. See W.A. Offshore Equip. Co., Inc. v. Parmatic Filter Corp., 767 F. 
Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1991); Davis v. Manpower Int’l, Inc., 623 So. 2d 946 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th 1993); Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
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 119. See NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1985); Wyatt v. PO2, 
Inc., 651 So. 2d 359, 361 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995). 
 120. See Muniz v. Kravis, 757 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (“The 
trial court properly held that an employment relationship does not constitute 
trade or commerce for purposes of [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act].”); Manning v. Zuckerman, 444 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1983) 
(“However, broad as this protection is, we believe that the Legislature did not 
intend the statute to cover employment contract disputes between employers and 
the employees who work in the employer’s organization. . . .”); Buie v. Daniel 
Int’l Corp., 289 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“Employment practices 
fall within the purview of other statutes adopted for that express purpose.”); 




understanding that the state’s legislature intended the statute to 
apply to the commercial relationships of businesses with 
consumers and business competitors, and that sufficient protections 
of employees’ interests exist in other statutes.121  
Still, the courts of other states have found room in their unfair 
trade practices acts to entertain actions brought by employees.122 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, for instance, recently held that 
employees do have standing to bring private actions under 
Hawaii’s unfair trade practices statute.123 This decision was based 
on a “plain language” reading of the statute’s grant of a private 
action to “any person” in conjunction with the statute’s expansive 
definition of “person.”124 That this same approach was utilized by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court to give a service provider standing 
under LUTPA suggests a similar result might be reached if the 
court were pressed in the future to decide whether an employee has 
standing.  
It is possible, however, that Louisiana courts might come to see 
LUTPA’s specific concern with unfair or deceptive practices “in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce”125 as precluding employee 
standing under the act. That is to say, although the definition of 
“any person” is no longer limited to business competitors and 
consumers, the statute might still be construed such that conduct 
arising in the employer–employee relationship cannot constitute a 
violation of the statute because it does not involve “trade or 
commerce.”126 Louisiana courts could easily adopt the argument 
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 123. Davis, 228 P.3d at 312–14 (Banquet server employees brought class 
action against hotel employers for improper retention of a mandatory “service 
charge” charged to customers; court found plain language of the statute, as well 
as statute’s legislative history, to support an interpretation giving the employees 
standing). 
 124. Id. at 309–312; HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-1 (Westlaw 2011) (“‘Person’ or 
‘persons’ includes individuals, corporations, firms, trusts, partnerships . . . and 
incorporated or unincorporated associations, existing under or authorized by the 
laws of this State, or any other state, or any foreign country.”). 
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 126. This issue will be of similar concern to other non-competitor/consumer 
plaintiffs who seek to use LUTPA. These plaintiffs might include, for example, 
a student seeking to use LUTPA against a university for what would 
traditionally be called “educational malpractice,” or a losing party to a lawsuit 




put forth by courts elsewhere that a state’s unfair trade practices 
act’s exclusive concern with acts or practices committed “in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce” precludes employee actions 
under the statute because though an employer may engage 
employees for the purpose of promoting trade or commerce, the 
employment relationship is not trade or commerce for the purposes 
of the statute.127 To do this, a Louisiana court would need to 
determine that Revised Statutes section 51:1402(9)’s definition of 
“trade or commerce”128 limits section 51:1405’s prohibition of 
unfair practices in the conduct of “trade or commerce” so as to 
exclude employee actions because plaintiff–employees would not 
have been parties to the marketplace transactions with which 
“trade or commerce” is exclusively concerned.129 At the same 
time, though, Louisiana courts could reject this approach on the 
argument that the “conduct of any trade or commerce”130 may 
encompass activities bound up in or facilitating the trade or 
commerce, such as the work performed by employees. 
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 129. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used this approach in 
refusing an employee standing under the state’s Consumer Protection Act, 
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Although the statutory language is not without ambiguity, we 
interpret the reference in § 11 to unfair or deceptive acts committed 
by “another person who engages in any trade or commerce” to refer 
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between an employee and the organization of which he is a member. 
Manning, 444 N.E.2d at 1265 (emphasis added). 
 130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405(A) (Supp. 2011). 




Another hurdle for employee actions under LUTPA will be the 
showing of an “ascertainable loss” of money or property.131 Where 
an employee has a contract of employment for a definite term or 
with specific promises for promotion, the employee will be able to 
readily identify a loss of future wages if he is wrongfully 
terminated or denied a promotion as a result of the employer’s use 
of unfair trade practices. However, an at-will employee does not 
have a right to continued employment and future wages as a 
contract employee does, and therefore will have some difficulty in 
showing the threshold loss necessary to bring the action. A court 
could dispense with this conceptual roadblock, though, by 
considering the employee’s reasonable expectation of continued 
employment to lay the foundation for an “ascertainable loss” of 
likely wages.132 That is, although the at-will employee did not have 
a right to continued employment, practically speaking it was the 
employer’s use of the unfair trade practice that has denied him 
wages that, ceteris paribus, he would have continued to receive at 
least in the immediate future. Louisiana courts have yet to address 
the meaning of “ascertainable loss” as used in the statute, and so 
this issue remains a major source of uncertainty for the viability of 
employee actions under LUTPA.  
Because the Cheramie decision did not suggest representative 
examples of the kinds of claimants to whom LUTPA actions would 
be newly available, there is room for judicial decisions to go either 
way on the issue of employee actions. It is now up to the courts to 
decide whether conduct arising in the employer–employee 
relationship will ever establish a sufficient basis for a LUTPA 
claim. And if conduct in this relationship might give rise to a 
LUTPA claim, it is further up to the courts to determine the 
parameters of this kind of conduct sufficient to state a claim. The 
following sections seek to illustrate situations in which employee 
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B. Actions for Termination or Discrimination by Employers in 
Furtherance of or Attendant to their Use of Unfair Trade Practices 
1. Alternative to Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public 
Policy 
Louisiana is among the handful of states that do not recognize 
any public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.133 The 
purpose of a public policy exception to employment at will is to 
identify certain grounds for termination that will support a cause of 
action for the tort of wrongful discharge.134 Public-policy 
exception cases may be grouped into four broad categories: (1) 
refusing to perform unlawful acts, (2) the exercise of legal rights, 
(3) whistleblowing, and (4) performing public duties.135 Although 
Louisiana does not recognize these public policy exceptions to at-
will employment for the purposes of a common-law tort action, the 
legislature has provided many of the same protections by statute in 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:967.136 
Before a court can create a public policy exception to 
employment at will, it must first identify a suitable public policy. 
Courts tend to find these policies in state statutes and regulations, 
though some make use of non-legislative sources of policy.137 In 
states that recognize the first type of exception, the public policy of 
deterring certain conduct, as evidenced by a statute prohibiting that 
conduct, would allow an employee to bring a wrongful discharge 
claim if he were terminated for refusing to engage in the conduct. 
Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:967 prohibits, and 
makes actionable, the termination of an employee because the 
employee “[o]bjects to or refuses to participate in an employment 
act or practice that is in violation of law.”138 
The same Louisiana case that established the former business 
competitor/consumer limitation on standing under LUTPA also 
established Louisiana’s refusal to recognize the tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.139 In Gil v. Metal Services 
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Gil, has said that “[a]side from the federal and state statutory exceptions, there 




Corp., the plaintiff Gil was a ten-year employee who was 
terminated for refusing to participate in his employer’s practice of 
removing identification marks from foreign steel so it could be 
delivered to customers who ordered domestic steel.140 Gil asserted 
two claims, one under LUTPA and another under Civil Code 
article 2315 for wrongful termination of employment.141 Gil did 
not attempt to use LUTPA as the statutory basis for his requested 
public policy exception to employment at will. Instead, he argued 
that Civil Code article 11 (now article 7) proscribes employment 
contracts that derogate from laws made for the preservation of the 
public order, and therefore he could not be terminated for breach of 
an employment contract that required him to engage in illegal 
activity.142 Gil’s LUTPA claim was predicated on having been 
fired “in furtherance” of his employer’s deceptive practices.143 Gil 
argued that he had standing because he suffered a loss (his 
termination) due to his employer’s use of unfair trade practices. 
Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected his LUTPA 
claim because he was not a consumer or business competitor.144 
The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim because 
“Louisiana’s traditional and unique deference to legislative 
authority” precluded the court from entertaining “[b]road policy 
considerations creating exceptions to employment at will.”145 
Because the court immediately dispensed with Gil’s LUTPA 
claim on the standing issue, it provided no intimation as to how it 
might have dealt with his “in furtherance” theory of a LUTPA 
action. An at-will employee should theoretically be able to show 
an ascertainable loss in these situations because LUTPA should 
here create a statutory-based exception (not a public policy 
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exception) to employment at will. The loss suffered is analogous to 
the loss compensated via Revised Statutes section 23:967’s award 
of damages.146 In much the same way that, under section 23:967, 
firing an at-will employee who refuses to violate the law creates a 
recoverable loss where there was none before, the termination of 
an at-will employee in contravention of LUTPA should also create 
a recoverable loss. 
If an employee can show an ascertainable loss of money or 
property, then whether the employee can state a successful LUTPA 
claim will depend on whether the court will find the employer’s 
unfair trade practice sufficiently entwined with the loss such that 
the employee’s loss might be said to be the “result” of the practice, 
as required by Revised Statutes section 51:1409(A).147 For 
guidance on this issue, Louisiana courts might look to some of the 
federal jurisprudence addressing the ability of employees to bring 
antitrust actions148 when their terminations were necessary to 
effectuate an anticompetitive scheme.149 One approach is to view 
the employee’s discharge as a direct result of the employer’s 
anticompetitive practice, and to consider the grant of standing to 
employees in these situations appropriate because it encourages the 
exposure of anticompetitive practices by persons best positioned to 
know of them.150 A contrasting approach is to reject the employee 
claim because his injury does not flow from the marketplace 
effects of the employer’s anticompetitive practice, and so allowing 
the employee’s action would expand the statute’s reach beyond 
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that which the legislature intended.151 Neither of these approaches 
is airtight, and either might be applied to LUTPA by analogy. 
If Louisiana courts refuse to find that the unfair and deceptive 
practices prohibited by LUTPA may encompass employer–
employee relations,152 then an employee terminated for his refusal 
to engage in these practices will be relegated to the use of Revised 
Statutes section 23:967 to recover for his termination for refusal to 
participate in a practice that is in violation of the law.153 In fact, an 
action under section 23:967 would usually provide much of the 
same protections and opportunities for damages, court costs, and 
attorney’s fees as a LUTPA claim.154 However, should the courts 
find employer–employee relations to fall within LUTPA’s scope, 
there are certain aspects of LUTPA that would make it preferable 
to section 23:967 as an avenue of redress for an employee who 
suffers a reprisal for whistleblowing or refusing to participate in an 
unlawful practice. First, section 23:967 requires an employee to 
have advised his employer of the violation of the law before he 
suffered the reprisal in order to recover under the statute.155 A 
LUTPA action would not be subject to this restriction. Second, and 
possibly most important, section 23:967 provides that an employer 
may be awarded attorney’s fees and court costs from the employee 
should a court determine that the complained-of practice was not in 
violation of the law.156 An employee bringing his claim under 
LUTPA would only be exposed to similar liability if the court 
found the suit to have been brought in bad faith or for the purposes 
of harassment.157 Finally, where an employer has previously been 
put on notice by the attorney general that his practices constitute 
LUTPA violations, the opportunity for treble damages would make 
the LUTPA claim preferable. 
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2. Termination Actions Not Analogous to Wrongful Discharge 
in Violation of Public Policy 
There may arise some situations, though, where section 23:967 
would not be an available alternative for an employee who might 
nonetheless demonstrate an ascertainable loss as the result of an 
employer’s unfair trade practices. An example of this is found in 
another Fourth Circuit case, Davis v. Manpower International, 
where the plaintiff–employee was terminated not because she 
refused to engage in the unfair trade practice, but instead because 
her usefulness as a collaborator in the unfair practice had run its 
course.158 There, the plaintiff had been enticed to leave her job at 
one employment agency to go to work for and bring her “client 
list” to a competing agency. Once the new agency had possession 
of the client list, though, it intentionally manipulated the plaintiff’s 
work environment in order to force her to resign.159 The argument 
was that the plaintiff’s termination was but the last step in the 
employer’s scheme to misappropriate his competitor’s client list. 
Because she was not a consumer or business competitor, the 
plaintiff’s LUTPA claim was dismissed for lack of standing.160  
The situation presented by this case shows an employee whose 
termination might be seen as the “result” of an employer’s use of 
an unfair trade practice, but does not involve an employee’s 
whistleblowing or a refusal to participate in an illegal practice as 
would be necessary for the employee to utilize section 23:967. If 
courts decide to sanction a theory by which employees can 
essentially sue for a wrongful discharge under LUTPA, then it will 
have the added benefit (or accompanying cost) of encompassing 
both Gil-type plaintiffs, who doubly deter unfair trade practices by 
both refusing to participate and bringing suit after termination, and 
Davis-type plaintiffs, who are decidedly less sympathetic but 
whose standing could nonetheless aid in deterring unfair trade 
practices through private enforcement. 
C. The Possibility of “Piggybacking”: Statutory Violations as a 
Basis for an Employee’s Action under LUTPA? 
“Piggybacking” in the context of state unfair trade practices acts 
refers to the use of violations of other statutes as per se violations of 
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the unfair trade practices statute.161 In some states, the violation of 
certain state or federal laws will indeed constitute a per se violation 
of the state’s unfair and deceptive practices law, though the type of 
statute that can be used in this manner is typically restricted to 
those that reflect the policies behind the unfair and deceptive 
practices law.162 For example, courts have found that a violation of 
Washington State’s usury law is a per se violation of the 
Washington Consumer Protection Act,163 a New York salesman’s 
failure to comply with the Door-to-Door Sales Protection Act 
triggers the state’s unfair and deceptive acts and practices 
statute,164 and a Maine builder’s violation of the Home 
Construction Contracts Act also renders him liable for violating the 
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.165 Some other states, however, 
consider the violation of related statutes to be completely separate 
from, and therefore not per se violations of, the state’s unfair trade 
practices act.166 
California’s unfair trade practices statute explicitly sanctions 
piggybacking. Its prohibition of “unlawful”167 conduct allows the 
statute to borrow violations of other laws in order to make them 
independently actionable as “unlawful practices.”168 California 
restaurant and casino employees have recently been able to use the 
unfair trade practices statute to bring actions based on a tip-pooling 
statute that does not provide for a private action itself.169 After 
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Cheramie, Louisiana employees may be able to use LUTPA in a 
similar piggybacking fashion. 
It has been argued elsewhere that Louisiana should incorporate 
piggybacking into LUTPA.170 This argument is based on the fact 
that piggybacking has been used in finding violations of section 5 
of the FTC Act,171 and that the adoption of piggybacking would be 
in line with the legislature’s intentions to both make LUTPA as 
broad as section 5 and use private actions as a tool to improve 
fairness in the marketplace.172  
Louisiana courts have yet to fully endorse the use of 
piggybacking in stating LUTPA claims, but the approach has also 
not been clearly rejected. Cases from Louisiana’s circuit courts of 
appeal indicate a willingness to find the violation of certain statutes 
to be per se LUTPA violations. The Fourth Circuit has found that 
where a defendant’s conduct allegedly violates the state’s antitrust 
laws, a valid LUTPA claim has been stated.173 The Fifth Circuit 
has found that where a LUTPA claim is based on a statutory 
violation that was preempted by federal law, the LUTPA claim is 
similarly preempted, seeming to suggest that piggybacking was 
otherwise appropriate.174 The First Circuit has held that statutory 
violations may give rise to a LUTPA claim, and that the fact that 
some statutes explicitly state that a violation will constitute an 
unfair trade practice for the purpose of Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 51:1405(A) does not indicate that the legislature intended 
LUTPA to be inapplicable to violations of statutes without this 
language.175 The Second and Third Circuits have found the tort of 
wrongful repossession to constitute a LUTPA violation.176 
Although Louisiana courts have not uniformly established a 
practice of recognizing the violation of any particular statute or 
group of statutes as per se LUTPA violations, the decisions noted 
above indicate that courts will be unlikely to deny LUTPA claims 
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based on the violation of laws closely related in purpose to 
LUTPA. This should not be surprising, given the judicial custom 
of finding an unfair trade practice where conduct “offends 
established public policy and . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious.”177 The likelihood that 
courts will recognize statutory violations that harm consumers or 
disrupt fair competition as coincidental LUTPA violations suggests 
that LUTPA may serve as a vehicle for plaintiffs to bring suit for 
violations of statutes that do not themselves provide for private 
actions. And, now that standing to bring a private action under 
LUTPA is no longer limited to business competitors and 
consumers, a variety of new plaintiffs can test LUTPA’s 
piggybacking waters. 
Certain state employment laws, namely three statutes within 
Part III of the “Miscellaneous Provisions” chapter of Louisiana’s 
Labor and Worker’s Compensation laws, entitled “Interference 
with Individual Rights,”178 illustrate how piggybacking under 
LUTPA may create new actions for employees. Louisiana Revised 
Statutes sections 23:962, 963, and 964, further explained below, do 
not expressly create a private action for affected employees. A 
search of reported cases similarly does not indicate whether these 
statutes can support a private action. An employee who seeks to 
use one of these statutes as the basis for a LUTPA claim can, 
however, argue that the employer’s statutory violation has both 
caused a loss to the employee and injured competition by allowing 
the employer to avoid the costs associated with compliance, which 
the employer’s competitors continue to bear.179 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:962 prohibits an 
employer from discharging employees on account of their political 
opinions or attempting to control its employees’ votes by any 
contract or agreement.180 In controlling the political activities and 
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votes of its employees, an employer who successfully violates this 
statute obtains an advantage over its law-abiding competitors who 
do not get the same added value from their employees. A violation 
of section 23:944, which prohibits the discharge of or 
discrimination against employees who testify at labor 
investigations,181 would vest similar advantages in the employer 
over its law-abiding competitors who do not enjoy the benefits of a 
workforce discouraged from cooperating with labor investigations. 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:963 prohibits an 
employer from coercing employees into purchasing or refraining 
from purchasing merchandise from a particular seller.182 A 
violation of this statute would be exemplified by the case of an 
employer who requires its employees to make purchases from the 
“company store.”183 The violating employer obviously harms 
competition in the market for the merchandise in question, and the 
employee suffers a loss resulting from either his discharge or 
punishment for failure to cooperate, or, if applicable, the higher 
prices he paid to the employer’s preferred seller. 
An employee’s use of piggybacking under LUTPA might also 
include an action based on a termination that allowed the employer 
to restock his workforce with employees whose employment is in 
violation of the law, such as those commonly referred to as 
“undocumented workers.” The possibility that the hiring of persons 
not lawfully able to work in the country constitutes an unfair trade 
practice has been discussed elsewhere.184 
While the use of LUTPA as an alternative to wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy would be limited to specific 
circumstances and might not present certain employees with any 
opportunities not already provided by Revised Statutes section 
23:967, the use of piggybacking would establish a broader base 
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from which employees might launch LUTPA claims. If an 
employee can connect his loss to a statutory violation that harms 
consumers or competition, then he might be able to state a LUTPA 
claim and achieve some recovery where he otherwise could not. 
The extent to which Louisiana courts will accept piggybacking 
under LUTPA remains unclear, but the value of this strategy for 
plaintiff–employees will eventually be borne out, should the 
courts, in fact, choose to sanction employee actions under the 
statute. 
D. Response to an Overbroad Noncompetition Agreement 
Noncompetition agreements, also called covenants not to 
compete, are instruments by which an employer may prevent or 
restrict employee competition after an employee’s termination or 
voluntary separation from the employer. In Louisiana, these 
agreements are only valid if they fit within the confines of 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921, which limits, among 
other things, the duration and geographical reach of such 
agreements.185 A noncompetition agreement is overbroad if its 
terms seek to restrict employee competition beyond that which is 
permitted by section 23:921.186 The Louisiana Supreme Court has 
recognized that Louisiana has long had a strong public policy 
disfavoring noncompetition agreements between employers and 
employees.187 Because these agreements are in derogation of the 
common right and hinder a person’s ability to support himself, 
they are to be strictly construed against the party seeking their 
enforcement.188 
The protections offered to an employee by Louisiana’s strong 
public policy against noncompetition agreements would appear to 
put an employee in a very good position should a former employer 
seek to enforce an overbroad noncompetition agreement so as to 
restrict or foreclose competition from the employee. Two recent 
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developments in Louisiana’s law of covenants not to compete, 
however, have chipped away at the employee’s protected 
position.189 These developments favoring employers may be 
partially offset by an employee’s use of a LUTPA claim in 
response to the threatened or attempted enforcement of an 
overbroad noncompetition agreement. 
One major erosion of an employee’s protections in the law of 
noncompetition agreements came with the legislature’s 2003 
amendment of Revised Statutes section 23:921, which said that a 
former employee’s “carrying on or engaging in a business similar 
to that of the employer”190 which noncompetition agreements may 
restrict includes becoming employed by an already existing 
competing firm.191 The Louisiana Supreme Court had previously 
construed section 23:921 to only allow noncompetition agreements 
to prevent an employee from starting a competing business.192 
Thus, employers now have a wider range of competition that may 
be restricted through a covenant not to compete.193 
Beyond this, the Louisiana Supreme Court has sanctioned the 
use of severability clauses in noncompetition agreements.194 This 
means that a noncompetition agreement can contain language that 
will preserve the enforceable provisions of the agreement should 
certain provisions of the agreement be found invalid and 
unenforceable. This gives an employer an incentive to test the 
limits of Revised Statutes section 23:921 when entering into a 
noncompetition agreement with his employee. An employer may 
also be encouraged to include some overbroad provisions in the 
agreement in the hopes that the employee will never challenge it 
and the agreement can simply operate in terrorem.195 In such a 
case, the employer is comforted by the knowledge that if part of 
the agreement is invalidated, some valid restrictions on 
competition in the agreement will still persist. The possibility that 
an employer will be faced with an employee’s LUTPA claim 
should the employer threaten or attempt to enforce an overbroad 
noncompetition agreement can provide a counterbalance to the 
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recently enhanced opportunities and incentives to restrict 
competition from former employees.  
Because the attempted enforcement of an overbroad 
noncompetition agreement actually involves business competitors, 
reconventional LUTPA actions were theoretically available to the 
competing former employee prior to Cheramie. Indeed, this 
strategy was tried in the past, though its use and nature have not 
been thoroughly examined by the courts. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court suggested in a 1989 decision that there exists an obligation 
not to enforce an illegal noncompetition agreement, and that a 
breach of this obligation is actionable under LUTPA.196 However, 
the court did not go on to apply this legal principle because the 
plaintiff’s action was barred by res judicata.197 An employee’s use 
of LUTPA in response to an overbroad noncompetition agreement 
has also been considered by one of Louisiana’s courts of appeal, 
though the employee in that case was unsuccessful in his LUTPA 
claim because he had been thriving in his competition with his 
former employer.198 The employee thus could not show any 
ascertainable loss as a result of the attempted enforcement of the 
unenforceable agreement.199 Finally, an employee’s LUTPA action 
against his former employer based on the threatened enforcement 
of a noncompetition agreement has been heard post-Cheramie by 
one of Louisiana’s U.S. District Courts.200 In that case, however, 
the court dismissed the plaintiff–employee’s LUTPA claim for 
lack of evidence that the defendant–employer did not reasonably 
believe in the enforceability of the noncompetition agreement.201 
The elements of an employee’s LUTPA action were not examined 
in the opinion on account of the plaintiff’s failure to meet the 
threshold issue of the employer’s lack of a reasonable belief in the 
enforceability of the agreement. 
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The importance of Cheramie to the law of covenants not to 
compete is that the ruling may now allow a current employee or 
non-competing former employee to bring a LUTPA action based 
on an employer’s threatened enforcement of a noncompetition 
agreement. An employee who is restrained from competing due to 
his former employer’s threats of enforcement (or attempted 
enforcement) of an overbroad noncompetition agreement is likely 
to satisfy all the necessary elements of a LUTPA claim. Should the 
agreement be deemed unenforceable, the employer has necessarily 
acted in contravention of a “strong public policy” in order to 
restrain the activities of his former employer.202 This should be 
sufficient to satisfy the definitional requirement of an unfair trade 
practice that the practice offend public policy and be unethical, 
oppressive, or substantially injurious,203 though as a matter of 
fairness a prudent court should take the employer’s reasonable 
belief in the validity of the agreement into account before finding a 
LUTPA violation in these cases. The employee suffers a loss in his 
abstention or exclusion from participating in a market for which 
his particular skill set and training presumably give him a 
competitive advantage. Whatever chilling effect a former 
employee’s use of LUTPA may have on the attempted 
enforcement of legitimate noncompetition agreements should be 
tempered by the fact that LUTPA claims brought in bad faith or for 
the purposes of harassment will result in attorney’s fees and costs 
being awarded to the defendant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Cheramie, there 
exists a wide opportunity for significant growth in the possible 
uses of the private action provided by the Louisiana Unfair Trade 
Practices Act. The private action is no longer the sole concern of 
business competitors and consumers: “any person,” broadly 
defined, who can show any ascertainable loss of money or property 
resulting from another’s use of unfair trade practices will now have 
standing to bring a private action under LUTPA. But because 
unfair trade practices are not legislatively defined and must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, it is up to Louisiana courts to 
determine what new kinds of plaintiffs and circumstances will be 
sufficient to uphold a LUTPA claim. Though the definition of “any 
person” is no longer subject to any judicially conceived restrictions 
beyond its plain meaning, what conduct will constitute an unfair 
                                                                                                             
 202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 




trade practice is still subject to judicially imposed limitations.204 
Moreover, the causal link between the unfair trade practice and a 
plaintiff’s ascertainable loss must still be proven.205 
It is uncertain whether courts will choose to find unfair trade 
practices in the dealings between individuals who are not business 
competitors, consumers, or service providers in situations 
analogous to those presented in Cheramie, but it is entirely 
possible that they will do so. Employees compose one group of 
plaintiffs who appear to be well-positioned to use private actions 
under LUTPA to their advantage. First, employees whose firings 
occurred “in furtherance” of an unfair trade practice may have a 
new statutory alternative to the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy, a tort that Louisiana, in contrast to the 
majority of other states, has refused to recognize. Second, insofar 
as Louisiana courts will permit the practice of piggybacking under 
LUTPA, the statute may now provide a private right of action for 
harm suffered as a result of employer conduct in contravention of 
other statutes that do not themselves provide for private actions. 
Finally, an employee may now be able to use LUTPA in response 
to an employer’s threatened enforcement of an overbroad 
noncompetition agreement. 
Though the future composition of private actions under 
LUTPA is uncertain, the statute’s grant of standing to “any 
person,” along with its broad prohibition and lucrative offer of 
damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs, make it likely that that 
the outlines of LUTPA will be more clearly defined in Louisiana’s 
common law of unfair trade practices in the coming years. 
Louisiana’s courts are now faced with the difficult task of 
balancing the threat of a flood of LUTPA litigation from myriad 
non-consumer, non-business-competitor plaintiffs against the 
potential societal benefits of enhanced private enforcement of 
Louisiana’s prohibition of trade practices that harm consumers and 
distort markets. 
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